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Abstract—
The recent growth of the Internet and its increased het-
erogeneity have increased the complexity of network proto-
col design and testing. In addition, the advent of multipoint
(multicast-based) applications has introduced new challenges
that are qualitatively different in nature than the traditional
point-to-point protocols. Multipoint applications typically in-
volve a group of participants simultaneously, and hence are
inherently more complex. As more multipoint protocols are
coming to life, the need for a systematic method to study
and evaluate such protocols is becoming more apparent. Such
method aims to expedite the protocol development cycle and
improve protocol robustness and performance.
In this paper, we present a new methodology for develop-
ing systematic and automatic test generation algorithms for
multipoint protocols. These algorithms attempt to synthesize
network topologies and sequences of events that stress the
protocol’s correctness or performance. This problem can be
viewed as a domain-specific search problem that suffers from
the state space explosion problem. One goal of this work is to
circumvent the state space explosion problem utilizing knowl-
edge of network and fault modeling, and multipoint protocols.
The two approaches investigated in this study are based on for-
ward and backward search techniques. We use an extended
finite state machine (FSM) model of the protocol. The first
algorithm uses forward search to perform reduced reachabil-
ity analysis. Using domain-specific information for multicast
routing over LANs, the algorithm complexity is reduced from
exponential to polynomial in the number of routers. This ap-
proach, however, does not fully automate topology synthesis.
The second algorithm, the fault-oriented test generation, uses
backward search for topology synthesis and uses backtracking
to generate event sequences instead of searching forward from
initial states.
Using these algorithms, we have conducted studies for cor-
rectness of the multicast routing protocol PIM. We propose to
extend these algorithms to study end-to-end multipoint pro-
tocols using a virtual LAN that represents delays of the un-
derlying multicast distribution tree.
I. Introduction
Network protocols are becoming more complex with the
exponential growth of the Internet, and the introduction of
new services at the network, transport and application lev-
els. In particular, the advent of IP multicast and the MBone
enabled applications ranging from multi-player games to dis-
tance learning and teleconferencing, among others. To date,
little effort has been exerted to formulate systematic meth-
ods and tools that aid in the design and characterization of
these protocols.
In addition, researchers are observing new and obscure, yet
all too frequent, failure modes over the internets [1] [2]. Such
failures are becoming more frequent, mainly due to the in-
creased heterogeneity of technologies, interconnects and con-
figuration of various network components. Due to the syn-
ergy and interaction between different network protocols and
components, errors at one layer may lead to failures at other
layers of the protocol stack. Furthermore, degraded perfor-
mance of low level network protocols may have ripple effects
on end-to-end protocols and applications.
Network protocol errors are often detected by application
failure or performance degradation. Such errors are hardest
to diagnose when the behavior is unexpected or unfamiliar.
Even if a protocol is proven to be correct in isolation, its
behavior may be unpredictable in an operational network,
where interaction with other protocols and the presence of
failures may affect its operation. Protocol errors may be
very costly to repair if discovered after deployment. Hence,
endeavors should be made to capture protocol flaws early in
the design cycle before deployment. To provide an effective
solution to the above problems, we present a framework for
the systematic design and testing of multicast protocols. The
framework integrates test generation algorithms with simu-
lation and implementation. We propose a suite of practical
methods and tools for automatic test generation for network
protocols.
Many researchers [3] [4] have developed protocol verifica-
tion methods to ensure certain properties of protocols, like
freedom from deadlocks or unspecified receptions. Much of
this work, however, was based on assumptions about the net-
work conditions, that may not always hold in today’s Inter-
net, and hence may become invalid. Other approaches, such
as reachability analysis, attempt to check the protocol state
space, and generally suffer from the ‘state explosion’ problem.
This problem is exacerbated with the increased complexity of
the protocol. Much of the previous work on protocol verifica-
tion targets correctness. We target protocol performance and
robustness in the presence of network failures. In addition,
we provide new methods for studying multicast protocols and
topology synthesis that previous works do not provide.
We investigate two approaches for test generation. The
first approach, called the fault-independent test generation,
uses a forward search algorithm to explore a subset of the
protocol state space to generate the test events automatically.
State and fault equivalence relations are used in this approach
to reduce the state space. The second approach is called
the fault-oriented test generation, and uses a mix of forward
and backward search techniques to synthesize test events and
topologies automatically.
We have applied these methods to multicast routing. Our
case studies revealed several design errors, for which we have
formulated solutions with the aid of this systematic process.
We further suggest an extension of the model to include
end-to-end delays using the notion of virtual LAN. Such ex-
tension, in conjunction with the fault-oriented test genera-
tion, can be used for performance evaluation of end-to-end
multipoint protocols.
The rest of this document is organized as follows. Sec-
2tion VI presents related work in protocol verification, con-
formance testing and VLSI chip testing. Section II intro-
duces the proposed framework, and system definition. Sec-
tions III, IV, V present the search based approaches and
problem complexity, the fault-independent test generation
and the fault-oriented test generation, respectively. Sec-
tion VII concludes 1.
• Multicast Routing Overview
Multicast protocols are the class of protocols that support
group communication. Multicast routing protocols include,
DVMRP [5], MOSPF [6], PIM-DM [7], CBT [8], and PIM-
SM [9]. Multicast routing aims to deliver packets efficiently
to group members by establishing distribution trees. Figure 1
shows a very simple example of a source S sending to a group
of receivers Ri.
S
R1
R2
R3
R4R5
S: sender to the group
Ri: receiver i of the group
Fig. 1
Establishing multicast delivery tree
Multicast distribution trees may be established by either
broadcast-and-prune or explicit join protocols. In the former,
such as DVMRP or PIM-DM, a multicast packet is broadcast
to all leaf subnetworks. Subnetworks with no local members
for the group send prune messages towards the source(s) of
the packets to stop further broadcasts. Link state protocols,
such as MOSPF, broadcast membership information to all
nodes. In contrast, in explicit join protocols, such as CBT
or PIM-SM, routers send hop-by-hop join messages for the
groups and sources for which they have local members.
We conduct robustness case studies for PIM-DM. We are par-
ticularly interested in multicast routing protocols, because
they are vulnerable to failure modes, such as selective loss,
that have not been traditionally studied in the area of pro-
tocol design.
For most multicast protocols, when routers are connected via
a multi-access network (or LAN)2, hop-by-hop messages are
multicast on the LAN, and may experience selective loss; i.e.
may be received by some nodes but not others. The likeli-
hood of selective loss is increased by the fact that LANs often
1We include appendices for completeness.
2We use the term LAN to designate a connected network with respect to
IP-multicast. This includes shared media (such as Ethernet, or FDDI), hubs,
switches, etc.
contain hubs, bridges, switches, and other network devices.
Selective loss may affect protocol robustness.
Similarly, end-to-end multicast protocols and applications
must deal with situations of selective loss. This differentiates
these applications most clearly from their unicast counter-
parts, and raises interesting robustness questions.
Our case studies illustrate why selective loss should be con-
sidered when evaluating protocol robustness. This lesson is
likely to extend to the design of higher layer protocols that
operate on top of multicast and can have similar selective
loss.
II. Framework Overview
Protocols may be evaluated for correctness or performance.
We refer to correctness studies that are conducted in the ab-
sence of network failures as verification. In contrast, robust-
ness studies consider the presence of network failures (such
as packet loss or crashes). In general, the robustness of a
protocol is its ability to respond correctly in the face of net-
work component failures and packet loss. This work presents
a methodology for studying and evaluating multicast proto-
cols, specifically addressing robustness and performance is-
sues. We propose a framework that integrates automatic test
generation as a basic component for protocol design, along
with protocol modeling, simulation and implementation test-
ing. The major contribution of this work lies in developing
new methods for generating stress test scenarios that target
robustness and correctness violation, or worst case perfor-
mance.
Instead of studying protocol behavior in isolation, we in-
corporate the protocol model with network dynamics and
failures in order to reveal more realistic behavior of protocols
in operation.
This section presents an overview of the framework and its
constituent components. The model used to represent the
protocol and the system is presented along with definitions
of the terms used.
Our framework integrates test generation with simulation
and implementation code. It is used for Systematic Testing
of Robustness by Evaluation of Synthesized Scenarios
(STRESS). As the name implies, systematic methods for sce-
nario synthesis are a core part of the framework. We use
the term scenarios to denote the test-suite consisting of the
topology and events.
The input to this framework is the specification of a pro-
tocol, and a definition of its design requirements, in terms of
correctness or performance. Usually robustness is defined in
terms of network dynamics or fault models. A fault model
represents various component faults; such as packet loss, cor-
ruption, re-ordering, or machine crashes. The desired output
is a set of test-suites that stress the protocol mechanisms
according to the robustness criteria.
As shown in Figure 2, the STRESS framework includes
test generation, detailed simulation driven by the synthesized
tests, and protocol implementation driven through an emu-
lation interface to the simulator. In this work we focus on
the test generation (TG) component.
3Automatic
Test
Generation (ATG)
Protocol Analysis through
Simulation
Test Patterns and
Scenarios
Emulation
Interface
Design
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Protocol Implementation
Test Signals
Testing
Analysis
and refinement
- Establish a protocol model (e.g. FSM)
- Obtain test sequences to stress certain
(e.g. robustness to message loss, or crashes)
aspects of the model
- Develop detailed protocol simulation
- Study the behavior under the stress
test-suites
- Implement the protocol
- Debug and study behavior using
the simulator output test signals
- Evaluate the test quality (e.g. using
code coverage)
Fig. 2
The STRESS framework
A. Test Generation
The core contribution of our work lies in the development
of systematic test generation algorithms for protocol robust-
ness. We investigate two such algorithms, each using a dif-
ferent approach.
In general test generation may be random or deterministic.
Generation of random tests is simple but a large set of tests
is needed to achieve a high measure of error coverage. Deter-
ministic test generation (TG), on the other hand, produces
tests based on a model of the protocol. The knowledge built
into the protocol model enables the production of shorter
and higher-quality test sequences. Deterministic TG can be:
a) fault-independent, or b) fault-oriented. Fault-independent
TG works without targeting individual faults as defined by
the fault model. Such an approach may employ a forward
search technique to inspect the protocol state space (or an
equivalent subset thereof), after integrating the fault into the
protocol model. In this sense, it may be considered a variant
of reachability analysis. We use the notion of equivalence
to reduce the search complexity. Section IV describes our
fault-independent approach.
In contrast, fault-oriented tests are generated for specified
faults. Fault-oriented test generation starts from the fault
(e.g. a lost message) and synthesizes the necessary topology
and sequence of events that trigger the error. This algorithm
uses a mix of forward and backward searches. We present
our fault-oriented algorithm in Section V.
We conduct case studies for the multicast routing proto-
col PIM-DM to illustrate differences between the approaches,
and provide a basis for comparison.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the system
model and definition.
B. The system model
We define our target system in terms of network and topol-
ogy elements and a fault model.
B.1 Elements of the network
Elements of the network consist of multicast capable nodes
and bi-directional symmetric links. Nodes run same multi-
cast routing, but not necessarily the same unicast routing.
The topology is an N-router LAN modeled at the network
level; we do not model the MAC layer.
For end-to-end performance evaluation, the multicast dis-
tribution tree is abstracted out as delays between end systems
and patterns of loss for the multicast messages. Cascade of
LANs or uniform topologies are addressed in future research.
B.2 The fault model
We distinguish between the terms error and fault. An error
is a failure of the protocol as defined in the protocol design
requirement and specification. For example, duplication in
packet delivery is an error for multicast routing. A fault is
a low level (e.g. physical layer) anomalous behavior, that
may affect the behavior of the protocol under test. Note
that a fault may not necessarily be an error for the low level
protocol.
The fault model may include: (a) Loss of packets, such
as packet loss due to congestion or link failures. We take
into consideration selective packet loss, where a multicast
packet may be received by some members of the group but
not others, (b) Loss of state, such as multicast and/or unicast
routing tables, due to machine crashes or insufficient mem-
ory resources, (c) The delay model, such as transmission,
propagation, or queuing delays. For end-to-end multicast
protocols, the delays are those of the multicast distribution
tree and depend upon the multicast routing protocol, and
(d) Unicast routing anomalies, such as route inconsistencies,
oscillations or flapping.
Usually, a fault model is defined in conjunction with the
robustness criteria for the protocol under study. For our
robustness studies we study PIM. The designing robustness
goal for PIM is to be able to recover gracefully (i.e. with-
out going into erroneous stable states) from single protocol
message loss. That is, being robust to a single message loss
implies that transitions cause the protocol to move from one
correct stable state to another, even in the presence of se-
lective message loss. In addition, we study PIM protocol
behavior in presence of crashes and route inconsistencies.
C. Test Sequence Definition
A fault model may include a single fault or multiple faults.
For our robustness studies we adopt a single-fault model,
where only a single fault may occur during a scenario or a
test sequence.
We define two sequences, T =< e1, e2, . . . , en > and T
′ =<
e1, e2, . . . , ej , f, ek, . . . , en >, where ei is an event and f is a
fault. Let P (q, T ) be the sequence of states and stimuli of
protocol P under test T starting from the initial state q.
T ′ is a test sequence if final P (q, T ′) is incorrect; i.e. the
stable state reached after the occurrence of the fault does
not satisfy the protocol correctness conditions (see Section II-
E) irrespective of P (q, T ). In case of a fault-free sequence,
4where T = T ′, the error is attributed to a protocol design
error. Whereas when T 6= T ′, and final P (q, T ) is correct,
the error is manifested by the fault. This definition ignores
transient protocol behavior. We are only concerned with the
stable (i.e. non-transient) behavior of a protocol.
D. Test Scenario
A test scenario is defined by a sequence of (host) events, a
topology, and a fault model, as shown in Figure 3.
Topology
Events
Faults
triggered timed interleaved
LAN
regular topologies
random
packet loss
crashes
routing
anomalies
Fig. 3
Test pattern dimensions
The events are actions performed by the host and act as
input to the system; for example, join, leave, or send packet.
The topology is the routed topology of set of nodes and links.
The nodes run the set of protocols under test or other sup-
porting protocols. The links can be either point-to-point
links or LANs. This model may be extended later to repre-
sent various delays and bandwidths between pairs of nodes,
by using a virtual LAN matrix (see [10]). The fault model
used to inject the fault into the test. According to our single-
message loss model, for example, a fault may denote the ‘loss
of the second message of type prune traversing a certain link’.
Knowing the location and the triggering action of the fault
is important in analyzing the protocol behavior.
E. Brief description of PIM-DM
For our robustness studies, we apply our automatic test
generation algorithms to a version of the Protocol Indepen-
dent Multicast-Dense Mode, or PIM-DM. The description
given here is useful for Sections III through V.
PIM-DM uses broadcast-and-prune to establish the multi-
cast distribution trees. In this mode of operation, a multicast
packet is broadcast to all leaf subnetworks. Subnetworks with
no local members send prune messages towards the source(s)
of the packets to stop further broadcasts.
Routers with new members joining the group trigger Graft
messages towards previously pruned sources to re-establish
the branches of the delivery tree. Graft messages are ac-
knowledged explicitly at each hop using the Graft-Ack mes-
sage.
PIM-DM uses the underlying unicast routing tables to get
the next-hop information needed for the RPF (reverse-path-
forwarding) checks. This may lead to situations where there
are multiple forwarders for a LAN. The Assert mechanism
prevents these situations and ensures there is at most one
forwarder for a LAN.
The correct function of a multicast routing protocol in gen-
eral, is to deliver data from senders to group members (only
those that have joined the group) without any data loss. For
our methods, we only assume that a correctness definition
is given by the protocol designer or specification. For illus-
tration, we discuss the protocol errors and the correctness
conditions.
E.1 PIM Protocol Errors
In this study we target protocol design and specification
errors. We are interested mainly in erroneous stable (i.e.
non-transient) states. In general, the protocol errors may
be defined in terms of the end-to-end behavior as functional
correctness requirements. In our case, for PIM-DM, an error
may manifest itself in one of the following ways:
1) black holes: consecutive packet loss between periods of
packet delivery, 2) packet looping: the same packet traverses
the same set of links multiple times, 3) packet duplication:
multiple copies of the same packet are received by the same
receiver(s), 4) join latency: lack of packet delivery after a
receiver joins the group, 5) leave latency: unnecessary packet
delivery after a receiver leaves the group 3, and 6) wasted
bandwidth: unnecessary packet delivery to network links that
do not lead to group members.
E.2 Correctness Conditions
We assume that correctness conditions are provided by the
protocol designer or the protocol specification. These condi-
tions are necessary to avoid the above protocol errors in a
LAN environment, and include 4:
1. If one (or more) of the routers is expecting to receive pack-
ets from the LAN, then one other router must be a forwarder
for the LAN. Violation of this condition may lead to data loss
(e.g. join latency or black holes).
2. The LAN must have at most one forwarder at a time. Vi-
olation of this condition may lead to data packet duplication.
3. The delivery tree must be loop-free:
(a) Any router should accept packets from one incoming in-
terface only for each routing entry. This condition is enforced
by the RPF (Reverse Path Forwarding) check.
(b) The underlying unicast topology should be loop-free 5.
Violation of this condition may lead to data packet looping.
4. If one of the routers is a forwarder for the LAN, then there
must be at least one router expecting packets from the LANs.
Violation of this condition may lead to leave latency.
III. Search-based Approaches
The problem of test synthesis can be viewed as a search
problem. By searching the possible sequences of events and
3Join and leave latencies may be considered in other contexts as perfor-
mance issues. However, in our study we treat them as errors.
4These are the correctness conditions for stable states; i.e. not during
transients, and are defined in terms of protocol states (as opposed to end
point behavior).
The mapping from functional correctness requirements for multicast rout-
ing to the definition in terms of the protocol model is currently done by the
designer. The automation of this process is part of future research.
5Some esoteric scenarios of route flapping may lead to multicast loops, in
spite of RPF checks. Currently, our study does not address this issue, as it
does not pertain to a localized behavior.
5faults over network topologies and checking for design re-
quirements (either correctness or performance), we can con-
struct the test scenarios that stress the protocol. However,
due to the state space explosion, techniques must be used
to reduce the complexity of the space to be searched. We
attempt to use these techniques to achieve high test quality
and protocol coverage.
Following we present the GFSM model for the case study
protocol (PIM-DM), and use it as an illustrative example
to analyze the complexity of the state space and the search
problem, as well as illustrate the algorithmic details and prin-
ciples involved in FITG and FOTG.
A. The Protocol Model
We represent the protocol as a finite state machine (FSM)
and the overall LAN system by a global FSM (GFSM).
I. FSM model: Every instance of the protocol, running on
a single router, is modeled by a deterministic FSM consist-
ing of: (i) a set of states, (ii) a set of stimuli causing state
transitions, and (iii) a state transition function (or table) de-
scribing the state transition rules. For a system i, this is
represented by the machine Mi = (S , τi, δi), where S is a
finite set of state symbols, τi is the set of stimuli, and δi is
the state transition function S × τi → S .
II. Global FSM model: The global state is defined as the
composition of individual router states. The output mes-
sages from one router may become input messages to other
routers. Such interaction is captured by the GFSM model in
the global transition table. The behavior of a system with n
routers may be described by MG = (SG, τG , δG), where SG :
S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn is the global state space, τG :
n⋃
i=1
τi is the
set of stimuli, and δG is the global state transition function
SG × τG → SG .
The fault model is integrated into the GFSM model. For
message loss, the transition caused by the message is either
nullified or modified, depending on the selective loss pattern.
Crashes may be treated as stimuli causing the routers affected
by the crash to transit into a crashed state 6. Network de-
lays are modeled (when needed) through the delay matrix
presented in Section VII.
B. PIM-DM Model
Following is the model of a simplified version of PIM-DM.
B.1 FSM model Mi = (Si, τi, δi)
For a given group and a given source (i.e., for a specific
source-group pair), we define the states w.r.t. a specific LAN
to which the router Ri is attached. For example, a state
may indicate that a router is a forwarder for (or a receiver
expecting packets from) the LAN.
6The crashed state maybe one of the states already defined for the pro-
tocol, like the empty state, or may be a new state that was not defined
previously for the protocol.
B.1.a System States (S). Possible states in which a router
may exist are:
State Symbol Meaning
Fi Router i is a forwarder for the LAN
Fi Timer i forwarder with Timer Timer running
NFi Upstream router i a non-forwarder
NHi Router i has the LAN as its next-hop
NHi Timer same as NHi with Timer Timer running
NCi Router i has a negative-cache entry
EUi Upstream router i is empty
EDi Downstream router i is empty
Mi Downstream router with attached member
NMi Downstream router with no members
The possible states for upstream and downstream routers
are as follows:
Si =


{Fi, Fi Timer , NFi, EUi},
if the router is upstream;
{NHi, NHi Timer , NCi,Mi, NMi, EDi},
if the router is downstream.
B.1.b Stimuli (τ ). The stimuli considered here include
transmitting and receiving protocol messages, timer events,
and external host events. Only stimuli leading to change
of state are considered. For example, transmitting messages
per se (vs. receiving messages) does not cause any change of
state, except for the Graft, in which case the Rtx timer is
set. Following are the stimuli considered in our study:
1. Transmitting messages: Graft transmission (GraftTx).
2. Receiving messages: Graft reception (GraftRcv), Join
reception (Join), Prune reception (Prune), Graft Acknowl-
edgement reception (GAck), Assert reception (Assert), and
forwarded packets reception (FPkt).
3. Timer events: these events occur due to timer expiration
(Exp) and include the Graft re-transmission timer (Rtx),
the event of its expiration (RtxExp), the forwarder-deletion
timer (Del), and the event of its expiration (DelExp). We
refer to the event of timer expiration as (T imerImplication).
4. External host events (Ext): include host sending pack-
ets (SPkt), host joining a group (HJoin or HJ), and host
leaving a group (Leave or L).
τ = {Join, Prune,GraftTx, GraftRcv, GAck,Assert,
FPkt,Rtx,Del, SPkt,HJ,L}.
B.2 Global FSM model
Subscripts are added to distinguish different routers.
These subscripts are used to describe router semantics and
how routers interact on a LAN. An example global state for
a topology of 4 routers connected to a LAN, with router 1
as a forwarder, router 2 expecting packets from the LAN,
and routers 3 and 4 have negative caches, is given by
{F1, NH2, NC3, NC4}. For the global stimuli τG , subscripts
are added to stimuli to denote their originators and recipi-
ents (if any). The global transition rules δG are extended to
encompass the router and stimuli subscripts 7.
7Semantics of the global stimuli and global transitions will be described
as needed (see Section V).
6C. Defining stable states
We are concerned with stable state (i.e. non-transient) be-
havior, defined in this section. To obtain erroneous stable
states, we need to define the transition mechanisms between
such states. We introduce the concept of transition classifi-
cation and completion to distinguish between transient and
stable states.
C.1 Classification of Transitions
We identify two types of transitions; externally triggered
(ET) and internally triggered (IT) transitions. The former is
stimulated by events external to the system (e.g., HJoin or
Leave), whereas the latter is stimulated by events internal to
the system (e.g., FPkt or Graft).
We note that some transitions may be triggered due to ei-
ther internal and external events, depending on the scenario.
For example, a Prune may be triggered due to forwarding
packets by an upstream router FPkt (which is an internal
event), or a Leave (which is an external event).
A global state is checked for correctness at the end of an
externally triggered transition after completing its dependent
internally triggered transitions.
Following is a table of host events, their dependent ET and
IT events:
Host Events SPkt HJoin Leave
ET events FPkt Graft Prune
IT events Assert, Prune, GAck Join
Join
C.2 Transition Completion
To check for the global system correctness, all stimulated
internal transitions should be completed, to bring the system
into a stable state. Intermediate (transient) states should
not be checked for correctness (since they may temporarily
seem to violate the correctness conditions set forth for sta-
ble states, and hence may give false error indication). The
process of identifying complete transitions depends on the
nature of the protocol. But, in general, we may identify a
complete transition sequence, as the sequence of (all) transi-
tions triggered due to a single external stimulus (e.g., HJoin
or Leave). Therefore, we should be able to identify a tran-
sition based upon its stimuli (either external or internal).
At the end of each complete transition sequence the system
exists in either a correct or erroneous stable state. Event-
triggered timers (e.g., Del, Rtx) fire at the end of a complete
transition.
D. Problem Complexity
The problem of finding test scenarios leading to proto-
col error can be viewed as a search problem of the protocol
state space. Conventional reachability analysis [11] attempts
to investigate this space exhaustively and incurs the ’state
space explosion’ problem. To circumvent this problem we
use search reduction techniques using domain-specific infor-
mation of multicast routing.
In this section, we give the complexity of exhaustive search,
then discuss the reduction techniques we employ based on
notion of equivalence, and give the complexity of the state
space.
D.1 Complexity of exhaustive search
Exhaustive search attempts to generate all states reachable
from initial system states. For a system of n routers where
each router may exist in any state si ∈ S, and |S| = s states,
the number of reachable states in the system is bounded by
(s)n. With l possible transitions we need l · (s)n state visits
to investigate all transitions. Faults, such as message loss
and crashes, increase the branching factor l, and may intro-
duce new states increasing S . For our case study |S| = 10,
while selective loss and crashes 8 increase branching almost
by factor of 9.
D.2 State reduction through equivalence
Exhaustive search has exponential complexity. To reduce
this complexity we use the notion of equivalence. Intuitively,
in multicast routing the order in which the states are consid-
ered is irrelevant (e.g., if router R1 or R4 is a forwarder is
insignificant, so long as there is only one forwarder). Hence,
we can treat the global state as an unordered set of state
symbols. This concept is called ‘counting equivalence’ 9. By
definition, the notion of equivalence implies that by investi-
gating the equivalent subspace we can test for protocol cor-
rectness. That is, if the equivalent subspace is verified to be
correct then the protocol is correct, and if there is an error in
the protocol then it must exist in the equivalent subspace 10.
D.2.a Symbolic representation. We use a symbolic rep-
resentation as a convenient form of representing the global
state to illustrate the notion of equivalence and to help in
defining the error and correct states in a succinct manner.
In the symbolic representation, r routers in state q are rep-
resented by qr. The global state for a system of n routers
8Crashes force any state to the empty state.
9Two system states (q1, q2, . . . , qn) and (p1, p2, . . . , pn) are strictly
equivalent iff qi = pi, where qi, pi ∈ S,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. However, all
routers use the same deterministic FSM model, hence all n! permutations of
(q1, q2, . . . , qn) are equivalent. A global state for a system with n routers
may be represented as
∏ |S|
i=1 s
ki
i , where ki is the number of routers in state
si ∈ S and Σ
|S|
i=1 ki = n. Formally, Counting Equivalence states that two
system states
∏ |S|
i=1 s
ki
i and
∏ |S|
i=1 s
li
i are equivalent if ki = li∀i.
10The notion of counting equivalence also applies to transitions and faults.
Those transitions or faults leading to equivalent states are considered equiv-
alent.
7is represented by G = (qr11 , q
r2
2 , . . . , q
rm
m ), where m = |S|,
Σri = n. For symbolic representation of topologies where n
is unknown ri ∈ [0, 1, 2, 1+, ∗] (‘1+’ is 1 or more, and ‘*’ is 0
or more).
To satisfy the correctness conditions for PIM-DM, the
correct stable global states are those containing no for-
warders and no routers expecting packets, or those con-
taining one forwarder and one or more routers expecting
packets from the link; symbolically this may be given by:
G1 =
(
F 0, NH0, NC∗
)
, and G2 =
(
F 1, NH1+, NC∗
)
. 11
We use X to denote any state si ∈ S . For example, {X −
F}∗ denotes 0 or more states si ∈ S − {F}. This symbolic
representation is used to estimate the size of the reduced
state space.
D.2.b Complexity of the state space with equiva-
lence reduction. Considering counting equivalence, find-
ing the number of equivalent states becomes a problem of
combinatorics. The number of equivalent states becomes
C(n+s−1, n) = (n+s−1)!
n!·(s−1)!
, where, n is the number of routers,
s is the number of state symbols, and C(x, y) = x!
y!·(x−y)!
, is
the number of y-combination of x-set [12].
D.3 Representation of error and correct states
Depending on the correctness definition we may get differ-
ent counts for the number of correct or error states. To get an
idea about the size of the correct or error state space for our
case study, we take two definitions of correctness and com-
pute the number of correct states. For the correct states of
PIM-DM, we either have: (1) no forwarders with no routers
expecting packets from the LAN, or (2) exactly one forwarder
with routers expecting packets from the LAN 12.
The correct space and the erroneous space must be disjoint
and they must be complete (i.e. add up to the complete
space), otherwise the specification is incorrect. See Appendix
I-A for details.
We present two correctness definitions that are used in our
case.
• The first definition considers the forwarder states as F and
the routers expecting packets from the LAN as NH . Hence,
the symbolic representation of the correct states becomes:
({X −NH − F}∗), or (NH,F, {X − F}∗),
11For convenience, we may represent these two states as G1 =
(
NC∗
)
,
and G2 =
(
F,NH1+, NC∗
)
.
12These conditions we have found to be reasonably sufficient to meet the
functional correctness requirements. However, they may not be necessary,
hence the search may generate false errors. Proving necessity is part of future
work.
and the number of correct states is: C(n+ s− 3, n) +C(n+
s− 4, n− 2).
• The second definition considers the forwarder states as
{Fi, Fi Del} or simply FX , and the states expecting packets
from the LAN as {NHi, NHi Rtx} or simply NHX . Hence,
the symbolic representation of the correct states becomes:
({X −NHX − FX}
∗), or (NHX , FX , {X − FX}
∗),
and the number of correct states is:
C(n+s−5, n)+4 ·C(n+s−5, n−2)−2 ·C(n+s−6, n−3).
Refer to Appendix I-B for more details on deriving the
number of correct states.
In general, we find that the size of the error state space, ac-
cording to both definitions, constitutes the major portion of
the whole state space. This means that search techniques
explicitly exploring the error states are likely to be more
complex than others. We take this in consideration when
designing our methods.
IV. Fault-independent Test Generation
Fault-independent test generation (FITG) uses the forward
search technique to investigate parts of the state space. As in
reachability analysis, forward search starts from initial states
and applies the stimuli repeatedly to produce the reachable
state space (or part thereof). Conventionally, an exhaus-
tive search is conducted to explore the state space. In the
exhaustive approach all reachable states are expanded until
the reachable state space is exhausted. We use several man-
ifestations of the notion of counting equivalence introduced
earlier to reduce the complexity of the exhaustive algorithm
and expand only equivalent subspaces. To examine robust-
ness of the protocol, we incorporate selective loss scenarios
into the search.
A. Reduction Using Equivalences
The search procedure starts from the initial states 13 and
keeps a list of states visited to prevent looping. Each state
is expanded by applying the stimuli and advancing the state
machine forward by implementing the transition rules and
returning a new stable state each time 14. We use the count-
ing equivalence notion to reduce the complexity of the search
in three stages of the search:
1. The first reduction we use is to investigate only the equiv-
alent initial states. To achieve this we simply treat the
set of states constituting the global state as unordered set
13For our case study the routers start as either a non-member (NM) or
empty upstream routers (EU), that is, the initial states I.S. = {NM,EU}.
14For details of the above procedures, see Appendix II-A.
8instead of ordered set. For example, the output of such
procedure for I.S. = {NM,EU} and n = 2 would be:
{NM,NM}, {NM,EU}, {EU,EU}.
One procedure that produces such equivalent initial state
space given in Appendix II-B. The complexity of the this
algorithm is given by C(n+ i.s.− 1, n) as was shown in Sec-
tion III-D.2 and verified through simulation.
2. The second reduction we use is during comparison of vis-
ited states. Instead of comparing the actual states, we com-
pare and store equivalent states. Hence, for example, the
states {NF1, NH2} and {NH1, NF2} are equivalent.
3. A third reduction is made based on the observation that
applying identical stimuli to different routers in identical
states leads to equivalent global states. Hence, we can elimi-
nate some redundant transitions. For example, for the global
state {NH1, NH2, F3} a Leave applied to R1 or R2 would
produce the equivalent state {NH1, NC1, F 1}. To achieve
this reduction we add flag check before advancing the state
machine forward. We call the algorithm after the third re-
duction the reduced algorithm.
In all the above algorithms, a forward step advances the
GFSM to the next stable state. This is done by applying all
the internally dependent stimuli (elicited due to the applied
external stimulus) in addition to any timer implications, if
any exists. Only stable states are checked for correctness.
B. Applying the Method
In this section we discuss how the fault-independent test
generation can be applied to the model of PIM-DM. We ap-
ply forward search techniques to study correctness of PIM-
DM. We first study the complexity of the algorithms without
faults. Then we apply selective message loss to study the pro-
tocol behavior and analyze the protocol errors.
B.1 Method input
The protocol model is provided by the designer or protocol
specification, in terms of a transition table or transition rules
of the GFSM, and a set of initial state symbols. The design
requirements, in terms of correctness in this case, is assumed
to be also given by the protocol specification. This includes
definition of correct states or erroneous states, in addition
to the fault model if studying robustness. Furthermore, the
detection of equivalence classes needs to be provided by the
designer 15. Currently, we do not automate the detection
of equivalent classes. Also, the number of routers in the
15For our case study, the symmetry inherent in multicast over LANs was
used to establish the counting equivalence for states, transitions and faults.
  Expanded States     Forwards               
Rtrs Exhaustive Reduced Exhaustive Reduced
3 178 30 2840 263
4 644 48 14385 503
6 7480 106 271019 1430
8 80830 200 4122729 3189
10 843440 338 55951533 6092
12 8621630 528 708071468 10483
14 86885238 778 8.546E+09 16738
          Transitions          Errors            
Rtrs Exhaustive Reduced Exhaustive Reduced
3 343 65 33 6
4 1293 119 191 13
6 14962 307 3235 43
8 158913 633 41977 101
10 1638871 1133 491195 195
12 16666549 1843 5441177 333
14 167757882 2799 58220193 523
Fig. 4
Simulation statistics for forward algorithms. Expanded States is
the number of stable states visited, Forwards is the number of
forward advances of the state machine, Transitions is the number
of transient states visited and Errors is the number of stable
state errors detected.
topology or topologies to be investigated (i.e., on the LAN)
has to be specified.
B.2 Complexity of forward search for PIM-DM
The procedures presented above were simulated for PIM-
DM to study its correctness. This set of results shows behav-
ior of the algorithms without including faults, i.e., when used
for verification. We identified the initial state symbols to be
{NM,EU}; NM for downstream routers and EU for up-
stream routers. The number of reachable states visited, the
number of transitions and the number of erroneous states
found were recorded. Summary of the results is given in Fig-
ure 4. The number of expanded states denotes the number of
visited stable states. The number of ‘forwards’ is the number
of times the state machine was advanced forward denoting
the number of transitions between stable states. The num-
ber of transitions is the number of visited transient states,
and the number of error states is the number of stable (or
expanded) states violating the correctness conditions. The
error condition is given as in the second error condition in
Section III-D.3. Note that each of the other error states is
equivalent to at least one error state detected by the re-
duced algorithm. Hence, having less number of discovered
error states by an algorithm in this case does not mean losing
any information or causes of error, which follows from the
definition of equivalence. Reducing the error states means
reducing the time needed to analyze the errors.
We notice that there significant reduction in the algorithm
complexity with the use of equivalence relations. In particu-
9lar, the number of transitions is reduced from O(4n) for the
exhaustive algorithm, to O(n4) for the reduced algorithm.
Similar results were obtained for the number of forwards,
expanded states and number of error states. The reduc-
tion gained by using the counting equivalence is exponential.
More detailed presentation of the algorithmic details and re-
sults are given in Appendix II.
For robustness analysis (vs. verification), faults are in-
cluded in the GFSM model. Intuitively, an increase in the
overall complexity of the algorithms will be observed. Al-
though we have only applied faults to study the behavior of
the protocol and not the complexity of the search, we an-
ticipate similar asymptotic reduction gains using counting
equivalence.
B.3 Summary of behavioral errors for PIM-DM
We used the above algorithm to search the protocol model
for PIM-DM. Correctness was checked automatically by the
method by checking the stable states (i.e., after applying
complete transitions). By analyzing the sequence of events
leading to error we were able to reason about the protocol be-
havior. Several PIM-DM errors were detected by the method,
some pertaining to correctness in the absence of message loss,
while others were only detected in the presence of message
loss. We have studied cases of up to 14-router LANs. Some-
times errors were found to occur in different topologies for
similar reasons as will be shown. Here, we only discuss results
for the two router and 3-router LAN cases for illustration.
• Only one error was detected in the two-router case. With
the initial state {EU,EU} (i.e., both routers are upstream
routers), the system enters the error state {F,NF}, where
there is a forwarder for the LAN but there are no routers
expecting packets or attached members. In this case the
Assert process chose one forwarder for the LAN, but there
were no downstream routers to Prune off the extra traffic,
and so the protocol causes wasted bandwidth.
• Several errors were detected for the 3-router LAN case:
– Starting from {EU,EU,EU} the system enters the error
state {F,NF,NF} for a similar reason to that given above.
– Starting from {NM,EU,EU} the system enters the er-
ror state {NC,NF, F}. By analyzing the trace of events
leading to the error we notice that the downstream router
NC pruned off one of the upstream routers, NF , before the
Assert process takes place to choose a winner for the LAN.
Hence the protocol causes wasted bandwidth.
– Starting from {NM,EU,EU} the system enters state
{NH, F, F}. This is due to the transition table rules, when
a forwarder sends a packet, all upstream routers in the EU
state transit into F state. This is not an actual error, how-
ever, since the system will recover with the next forwarded
packet using Assert 16. The detection of this false-error could
have been avoided by issuing SPkt stimulus before the error
check, to see if the system will recover with the next packet
sent.
– With message loss, errors were detected for Join and
Prune loss. When the system is in {NH,NH,F} state and
one of the downstream members leaves (i.e., issues L event), a
Prune is sent on the LAN. If this Prune is selectively lost by
the other downstream router, a Join will not be sent and the
system enters state {NC,NH,NF}. Similarly, if the Join is
lost, the protocol ends up in an error state.
C. Challenges and Limitations
In order to generalize the fault-independent test generation
method, we need to address several open research issues and
challenges.
• The topology is an input to the method in terms of number
of routers. To add topology synthesis to FITG we may use
the symbolic representation presented in Section III-D, where
the use of repetition constructs 17 may be used to represent
the LAN topology in general. A similar principle was used
in [13] for cache coherence protocol verification, where the
state space is split using repetition constructs based on the
correctness definition. In Section V we present a new method
that synthesizes the topology automatically as part of the
search process.
• Equivalence classes are given as input to the method. In
this study we have used symmetries inherent in multicast
routing on LANs to utilize equivalence. This symmetry may
not exist in other protocols or topologies, hence the forward
search may become increasingly complex. Automating iden-
tification of equivalence classes is part of future work.
Other kinds of equivalence may be investigated to reduce
complexity in these cases 18. Also, other techniques for
complexity reduction may be investigated, such as statis-
tical sampling based on randomization or hashing used in
16This is one case where the correctness conditions for the model are suffi-
cient but not necessary to meet the functional requirements for correctness,
thus leading to a false error. Sufficiency and necessity proofs are subject of
future work.
17Repetition constructs include, for example, the ‘*’ to represent zero or
more states, or the ‘1+’ to represent one or more states, ‘2+’ two or more,
so on.
18An example of another kind of equivalence is fault dominance, where a
system is proven to necessarily reach one error before reaching another, thus
the former error dominates the latter error.
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SPIN [14]. However, sampling techniques do not achieve full
coverage of the state space.
• The topology used in this study is limited to a single-hop
LAN. Although we found it quite useful to study multicast
routing over LANs, the method needs to be extended to
multi-hop LAN to be more general. Our work in [10] intro-
duces the notion of virtual LAN, and future work addresses
multi-LAN topologies.
In sum, the fault-independent test generation may be used
for protocol verification given the symmetry inherent in the
system studied (i.e., protocol and topology). For robustness
studies, where the fault model is included in the search, the
complexity of the search grows. In this approach we did not
address performance issues or topology synthesis. These is-
sues are addressed in the coming sections. However, we shall
re-use the notion of forward search and the use of counting
equivalence in the method discussed next.
V. Fault-oriented Test Generation
In this section, we investigate the fault-oriented test gen-
eration (FOTG), where the tests are generated for specific
faults. In this method, the test generation algorithm starts
from the fault(s) and searches for a possible error, establish-
ing the necessary topology and events to produce the error.
Once the error is established, a backward search technique
produces a test sequence leading to the erroneous state, if
such a state is reachable. We use the FSM formalism pre-
sented in Section III to represent the protocol. We also re-use
some ideas from the FITG algorithm previously presented,
such as forward search and the notion of equivalence for
search reduction.
A. FOTG Method Overview
Fault-oriented test generation (FOTG) targets specific
faults or conditions, and so is better suited to study ro-
bustness in the presence of faults in general. FOTG has
three main stages: a) topology synthesis, b) forward im-
plication and error detection, and c) backward implication.
The topology synthesis establishes the necessary components
(e.g., routers and hosts) of the system to trigger the given
condition (e.g., trigger a protocol message). This leads to
the formation of a global state in the middle of the state
space 19. Forward search is then performed from that global
state in its vicinity, i.e., within a complete transition, after
applying the fault. This process is called forward implica-
19The global state from which FOTG starts is synthesized for a given fault,
such as a message to be lost.
tion, and uses search techniques similar to those explained
earlier in Section IV. If an error occurs, backward search
is performed thereafter to establish a valid sequence lead-
ing from an initial state to the synthesized global state. To
achieve this, the transition rules are reversed and a search is
performed until an initial state is reached, or the synthesized
state is declared unreachable. This process is called backward
implication.
Much of the algorithmic details are based on condition→
effect reasoning of the transition rules. This reasoning is
emphasized in the semantics of the transition table used in
the topology synthesis and the backward search. Section V-
A.1 describes these semantics. In Section V-B we describe the
algorithmic details of FOTG, and in Section V-C we describe
how FOTG was applies to PIM-DM in our case study, and
present the results and method evaluation. Section V-D we
discuss the limitations of the method and our findings.
A.1 The Transition Table
The global state transition may be represented in sev-
eral ways. Here, we choose a transition table representation
that emphasizes the effect of the stimuli on the system, and
hence facilitates topology synthesis. The transition table de-
scribes, for each stimulus, the conditions of its occurrence.
A condition is given as stimulus and state or transition (de-
noted by stimulus.state/trans), where the transition is given
as startState→ endState.
We further extend message and router semantics to cap-
ture multicast semantics. Following, we present a detailed
description of the semantics of the transition table then give
the resulting transition table for our case study, to be used
later in this section.
A.1.a Semantics of the transition table. In this subsec-
tion we describe the message and router semantics, pre-
conditions, and post-conditions.
• Stimuli and router semantics: Stimuli are classified based
on the routers affected by them. Stimuli types include:
1. orig: stimuli or events occurring within the router orig-
inating the stimulus but do not affect other routers, and in-
clude HJ , L, SPkt, GraftTx, Del and Rtx.
2. dst: messages that are processed by the destination
router only, and include Join, GAck and GraftRcv.
3. mcast: multicast messages that are processed by all
other routers, and include Assert and FPkt.
4. mcastDownstream: multicast messages that are pro-
cessed by all other downstream routers, but only one up-
stream router, and includes the Prune message.
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These types are used by the search algorithm for processing
the stimuli and messages. According to these different types
of stimuli processing a router may take as subscript ‘orig’,
‘dst’, or ‘other’. The ‘orig’ symbol designates the originating
router of the stimulus or message, whereas ‘dst’ designates
the destination of the message. ‘other’ indicates routers other
than the originator. Routers are also classified as upstream
or downstream as presented in Section III.
• Pre-Conditions: The pre-conditions in general are of
the form stimulus.state/transition, where the transition is
given as startState → endState. If there are several pre-
conditions, then we can use a logical OR to represent the
rule. At least one pre-condition is necessary to trigger the
stimulus. Example of a stimulus.state condition is the con-
dition for Join message, namely, Pruneother.NHorig, that is,
a Join is triggered by the reception of a Prune from another
router, with the originator of the Join in NH . An example
of a stimulus.transition condition is the condition for Graft
transmission HJ.(NC → NH); i.e. a host joining and the
transition of the router from the negative cache state to the
next hop state.
• Post-Conditions: A post-condition is an event and/or
transition that is triggered by the stimulus. 20 Post-
conditions may be in the form of: (1) transition,
(2) condition.transition, (3) condition.stimulus, and (4)
stimulus.transition.
1. transition: has an implicit condition with which it is
associated; i.e. ‘a → b’ means ‘if a ∈ GState then a → b’.
For example, Join post-condition (NFdst → Fdst), means if
NFdst ∈ GState then transition NF → F will occur.
2. Condition.transition: is same as (1) except the condi-
tion is explicit 21.
3. Condition.stimulus: if the condition is satisfied then the
stimulus is triggered. For example, Prune post-condition
‘NHother.Joinother ’, means that for all NHx ∈ GState
(where x is not equal to orig) then have router x trigger
a Join.
4. Stimulus.transition: has the transition condition im-
plied as in (1) above. For example, GraftRcv post-condition
‘GAck.(NFdst → Fdst)’, means if NFdst ∈ GState, then the
transition occurs and GAck is triggered.
If more than one post-condition exists, then the logical re-
lation between them is either an ‘XOR’ if the router is the
20Network faults, such as message loss, may cause the stimulus not to
take effect. For example, losing a Join message will cause the event of Join
reception not to take effect.
21This does not appear in our case study.
same, or an ‘AND’ if the routers are different. For example,
Join post-conditions are ‘Fdst Del → Fdst, NFdst → Fdst’,
which means (Fdst Del → Fdst) XOR (NFdst → Fdst).
22
On the other hand, Prune post-conditions are ‘Fdst →
Fdst Del, NHother.Joinother ’, which implies that the transi-
tion will occur if Fdst ∈ GState AND a Join will be triggered
if NH ∈ GState.
Following is the transition table used in our case study.
Stimulus Pre-conditions Post-conditions
Join Pruneother .NHorig Fdst Del → Fdst, NFdst → Fdst
Prune L.NC,FPkt.NC Fdst → Fdst Del,
NHother.Joinother
GraftTx HJ.(NC → NH), GraftRcv.(NH → NH Rtx)
RtxExp.(NH Rtx → NH)
GraftRcv GraftTx.(NH → NH Rtx) GAck.(NFdst → Fdst)
GAck GraftRcv.F NHdst Rtx → NHdst
Assert FPktother .Forig Fother → NFother
FPkt Spkt.F Prune.(NM → NC),
ED → NH,M → NH,
EUother → Fother , Fother.Assert
Rtx RtxExp GraftTx.(NHorig Rtx → NHorig)
Del DelExp Forig Del → NForig
SPkt Ext FPkt.(EUorig → Forig)
HJoin Ext NM → M,GraftTx.(NC → NH)
Leave Ext M → NM,Prune.(NH → NC),
Prune.(NHRtx → NC)
The above pre-conditions can be derived automatically
from the post-conditions. In Appendix III, we describe the
‘PreConditions’ procedure that takes as input one form of the
conventional post-condition transition table and produces the
pre-condition semantics.
A.1.b State Dependency Table. To aid in test sequence
synthesis through the backward implication procedure, we
construct what we call a state dependency table. This table
can be inferred automatically from the transition table. We
use this table to improve the performance of the algorithm
and for illustration.
For each state, the dependency table contains the possible
preceding states and the stimulus from which the state can be
reached or implied. To obtain this information for a state s,
the algorithm the post-conditions of the transition table for
entries where the endState of a transition is s. In addition,
a state may be identified as an initial state (I.S.), and hence
can be readily established without any preceding states. The
‘dependencyTable’ procedure in Appendix III generates the
dependency table from the transition table of conditions. For
s ∈ I.S. a symbol denoting initial state is added to the array
entry. For our case study I.S. = {NM,EU}. Based on
22There is an implicit condition that can never be satisfied in both state-
ments, which is the existence of dst in only one state at a time.
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the above transition table, following is the resulting state
dependency table: 23
State Possible Backward Implication(s)
Fi
FPktother
←− EUi,
Join
←− Fi Del,
Join
←− NFi,
GraftRcv
←− NFi,
SPkt
←− EUi
Fi Del
Prune
←− Fi
NFi
Del
←− Fi Del,
Assert
←− Fi
NHi
Rtx,GAck
←− NHi Rtx,
HJ
←− NCi,
FPkt
←− Mi,
FPkt
←− EDi
NHi Rtx
GraftTx
←− NHi
NCi
FPkt
←− NMi,
L
←− NHi Rtx,
L
←− NHi
EUi ← I.S.
EDi ← I.S.
Mi
HJ
←− NMi
NMi
L
←− Mi,← I.S.
In cases where the stimulus affects more than one router
(e.g., multicast Prune), multiple states need to be simul-
taneously implied in one backward step, otherwise an I.S.
may not be reached. To do this, the transitions in the post-
conditions of the stimulus are traversed, and any states in
the global state that are endStates are replaced by their cor-
responding startStates. For example, {Mi, NMj , Fk}
FPkt
←−
{NHi, NCj , Fk}. This is taken care of by the backward im-
plication section described later.
B. FOTG details
As previously mentioned, our FOTG approach consists of
three phases: I) synthesis of the global state to inspect, II)
forward implication, and III) backward implication. These
phases are explained in more detail in this section. In Sec-
tion V-C we present an illustrative example for the these
phases.
B.1 Synthesizing the Global State
Starting from a condition (e.g., protocol message or stimu-
lus), and using the information in the protocol model (i.e.
the transition table), a global state is synthesized for inves-
tigation. We refer to this state as the global-state inspected
(GI), and it is obtained as follows:
1. The global state is initially empty and the inspected stim-
ulus is initially set to the stimulus investigated.
2. For the inspected stimulus, the state(s) (or the
startState(s) of the transition) of the post-condition are ob-
tained from the transition table. If these states do not exist
in the global state, and cannot be inferred therefrom, then
they are added to the global state.
23The possible backward implications are separated by ‘commas’ indicat-
ing ‘OR’ relation.
3. For the inspected stimulus, the state(s) (or the
endState(s) of the transition) of the pre-condition are ob-
tained. If these states do not exist in the global state, and
cannot be inferred therefrom, then they are added to the
global state.
4. Get the stimulus of the pre-condition of the inspected
stimulus, call it newStimulus. If newStimulus is not
external (Ext), then set the inspected stimulus to the
newStimulus, and go back to step 2.
The second step considers post-conditions and adds system
components that will be affected by the stimulus. While the
third and forth steps synthesize the components necessary to
trigger the stimulus. The procedure given in Appendix III
synthesizes minimum topologies necessary to trigger a given
stimulus of the protocol.
Note that there may be several pre-conditions or post-
conditions for a stimulus, in which case several choices can be
made. These represent branching points in the search space.
At the end of this stage, the global state to be investigated
is obtained.
B.2 Forward Implication
The states following GI (i.e. GI+i where i > 0) are obtained
through forward implication. We simply apply the transi-
tions, starting from GI , as given by the transition table, in
addition to implied transitions (such as timer implication).
Furthermore, faults are incorporated into the search. For
example, in the case of a message loss, the transition that
would have resulted from the message is not applied. If more
than one state is affected by the message, then the space is
expanded to include the various selective loss scenarios for
the affected routers. For crashes, the routers affected by the
crash transit into the crashed state as defined by the ex-
panded transition rules, as will be shown in Section V-C.
Forward implication uses the forward search techniques de-
scribed earlier in Section IV.
According to the transition completion concept (see Sec-
tion III-C.2), the proper analysis of behavior should start
from externally triggered transitions. For example, the anal-
ysis should not consider a Join without considering the
Prune triggering it and its effects on the system. Thus, the
global system state must be rolled back to the beginning of
a complete transition (i.e. the previous stable state) before
applying the forward implication. This will be implied in the
forward implication algorithm to simplify the discussion.
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B.3 Backward Implication
Backward implication attempts to obtain a sequence of
events leading to GI , from an initial state (I.S.), if such a
sequence exists; i.e. if GI is reachable from I.S.
The state dependency table described in Section V-A.1.b
is used in the backward search.
Backward steps are taken for the components in the global
state GI , each step producing another global state GState.
For each state in GState possible backward implication rules
are attempted to obtain valid backward steps toward an ini-
tial state. This process is repeated for preceding states in a
depth first fashion. A set of visited states is maintained to
avoid looping. If all backward branches are exhausted and
no initial state was reached the state is declared unreachable.
To rewind the global state one step backward, the re-
verse transition rules are applied. Depending on the stim-
ulus type of the backward rule, different states in GState
are rolled back. For orig and dst only the originator and
destination of the stimulus is rolled back, respectively. For
mcast, all affected states are rolled back except the origina-
tor. mcastDownstream is similar to mcast except that all
downstream routers or states are rolled back, while only one
upstream router (the destination) is rolled back. Appendix
III shows procedures ‘Backward’ and ‘Rewind’ that imple-
ment the above steps.
Note, however, that not all backward steps are valid, and
backtracking is performed when a backward step is invalid.
Backtracking may occur when the preceding states contradict
the rules of the protocol. These contradictions may manifest
themselves as:
• Src not found: src is the originator of the stimulus, and the
global state has to include at least one component to originate
the stimulus. An example of this contradiction occurs for the
Prune stimulus, for a global state {NH, F,NF}, where the
an originating component of the Prune (NC in this case)
does not belong to the global state.
• Failure of minimum topology check: the necessary con-
ditions to trigger the stimulus must be present in the
global topology. Examples of failing the minimum topol-
ogy check include, for instance, Join stimulus with global
state {NH,NF}, or Assert stimulus with global state
{F,NH,NC}.
• Failure of consistency check: to maintain consistency of
the transition rules in the reverse direction, we must check
that every backward step has an equivalent forward step. To
achieve this, we must check that there is no transition x→ y
for the given stimulus, such that x ∈ GState. Since if x
remains in the preceding global state, the corresponding for-
ward step would transform x into y and the system would ex-
ist in a state inconsistent with the initial global state (before
the backward step). An example of this inconsistency ex-
ists when the stimulus is FPkt and GState = {F,NF,EU},
where EU → F is a post condition for FPkt. See Appendix
III for the consistency check procedure.
C. Applying The Method
In this section we discuss how the fault-oriented test gen-
eration can be applied to the model of PIM-DM. Specifi-
cally, we discuss in details the application of FOTG to the
robustness analysis of PIM-DM in the presence of single mes-
sage loss and machine crashes. We first walk through a sim-
ple illustrative example. Then we present the results of the
case study in terms of correctness violations captured by the
method.
C.1 Method input
The protocol model is provided by the designer or proto-
col specification, in terms of a transition table 24, and the
semantics of the messages. In addition, a list of faults to be
studied is given as input to the method. For example, def-
inition of the fault as single selective protocol message loss,
applied to the list of messages {Join, Prune,Assert,Graft}.
Also a set of initial state symbols, in our case {NM,EU}. A
definition of the design requirement, in this case definition of
correctness, is also provided by the specification. The rest of
the process is automated.
C.2 Illustrative example
Figure 5 shows the phases of FOTG for a simple example of
a Join loss. Following are the steps taken for that example:
Synthesizing the Global State
1. Join: startState of post-condition is NFdst ⇒ GI = {NFk}
2. Join: state of pre-condition is NHi ⇒ GI = {NHi,NFk}, goto Prune
3. Prune: startState of post-condition is Fk, implied from NFk in GI
4. Prune: state of pre-condition is NCj ⇒ GI = {NHi,NFk,NCj}, goto L
(Ext)
5. startState of post-condition is NH can be implied from NC in GI
Forward implication
without loss: GI = {NHi,NFk,NCj}
Join
−→ GI+1 = {NHi, Fk,NCj}
loss w.r.t. Rj : {NHi,NFk,NCj} −→ GI+1 = {NHi, NFk,NCj} error
24The traditional input/output transition table is sufficient for our
method. The pre/post-condition transition table can be derived automati-
cally therefrom.
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FPkt
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HJi
Fig. 5
Join topology synthesis, forward/backward implication
Backward implication
GI = {NHi, NFk,NCj}
Prune
←− GI−1 = {NHi, Fk,NCj}
FPkt
←− GI−2 =
{Mi, Fk,NMj}
SPkt
←− GI−3 = {Mi,EUk, NMj}
HJi
←− GI−4 =
{NMi,EUk,NMj} = I.S.
Losing the Join by the forwarding router Rk leads to an
error state where router Ri is expecting packets from the
LAN, but the LAN has no forwarder.
C.3 Summary of Results
In this section we briefly discuss the results of applying
our method to PIM-DM. The analysis is conducted for single
message loss and momentary loss of state. For a detailed
analysis of the results see Appendix III-G.
C.3.a Single message loss. We have studied single mes-
sage loss scenarios for the Join, Prune,Assert, and Graft
messages. For this subsection, we mostly consider non-
interleaved external events, where the system is stimulated
only once between stable states. The Graft message is par-
ticularly interesting, since it is acknowledged, and it raises
timing and sequencing issues that we address in a later sub-
section, where we extend our method to consider interleaving
of external events.
Our method as presented here, however, may not be gener-
alized to transform any type of timing problem into sequenc-
ing problem. This topic bears more research in the future.
We have used the sequences of events generated automati-
cally by the algorithm to analyze protocol errors and suggest
A
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A B
Graft
Graft
GAck
A B
time
Graft
GAck
(I) no loss (II) loss of Graft
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Graft
Prune
Graft
GAck
(III) loss of Graft &
interleaved Prune
t1 t1
t2
t2
t3
t3
t4
Fig. 6
Graft event sequencing
fixes for those errors.
Join: A scenario similar to that presented in Section V-
C.2 incurred an error. In this case, the robustness violation
was not allowing another chance to the downstream router
to send a Join. A suggested fix would be to send another
prune by FDel before the timer expires.
Prune: In the topology above, an error occurs when Ri
loses the Prune, hence no Join is triggered. The fix sug-
gested above takes care of this case too.
Assert: An error in the Assert case occurs with no down-
stream routers; e.g. GI = {Fi, Fj}. The design error is the
absence of a mechanism to prevent pruning packets in this
case. One suggested fix would be to have the Assert winner
schedule a deletion timer (i.e. becomes FDel) and have the
downstream receiver (if any) send Join to the Assert winner.
Graft: A Graft message is acknowledged by GAck, hence
the protocol did not incur error when the Graft message
was lost with non-interleaved external events. The protocol
is robust to Graft loss with the use of Rtx timer. Adversary
external conditions are interleaved during the transient states
and the Rtx timer is cleared, such that the adverse event will
not be overridden by the Rtx mechanism.
To clear the Rtx timer, a transition should be created from
NHRtx to NH which is triggered by a GAck according to the
state dependency table (NH
GAck
←− NHRtx). This transition
is then inserted in the event sequence, and forward and back-
ward implications are used to obtain the overall sequence of
events illustrated in Figure 6. In the first and second sce-
narios (I and II) no error occurs. In the third scenario (III)
when a Graft followed by a Prune is interleaved with the
Graft loss, the Rtx timer is reset with the receipt of the
GAck for the first Graft, and the systems ends up in an
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error state. A suggested fix is to add sequence numbers to
Grafts, at the expense of added complexity.
C.3.b Loss of State. We consider momentary loss of
state in a router. A ‘Crash’ stimulus transfers the crashed
router from any state ‘X’ into ‘EU’ or ‘ED’. Hence, we add
the following line to the transition table:
Stimulus Pre-cond Post-cond (stimulus.state/trans)
Crash Ext {NM,M,NH,NC,NHRtx} → ED,
{F,FDel, NF} → EU
The FSM resumes function immediately after the crash
(i.e. further transitions are not affected). We analyze the
behavior when the crash occurs in any router state. For every
state, a topology is synthesized that is necessary to create
that state. We leverage the topologies previously synthesized
for the messages. For example, state FDel may be created
from state F by receiving a Prune (FDel
Prune
←− F ). Hence we
may use the topologies constructed for Prune loss to analyze
a crash for FDel state.
Forward implication is then applied, and behavior after the
crash is checked for correct packet delivery. To achieve this,
host stimuli (i.e. SPkt, HJ and L) are applied, then the
system state is checked for correctness.
In lots of the cases studied, the system recovered from the
crash (i.e. the system state was eventually correct). The re-
covery is mainly due to the nature of PIM-DM; where proto-
col states are re-created with reception of data packets. This
result is not likely to extend to protocols of other natures;
e.g. PIM Sparse-Mode [15].
However, in violation with robustness requirements, there
existed cases in which the system did not recover. In Figure 7,
the host joining in (II, a) did not have the sufficient state to
send a Graft and hence gets join latency until the negative
cache state times out upstream and packets are forwarded
onto the LAN as in (II, b).
NF NF NF F NF F
NH ED M NH NM NC
(I)
NH Crash ED
(II)
HJ
SPkt
(III)
L
SPkt
Prune
(a) (b)
FPkt FPkt
Fig. 7
Crash leading to join latency
In Figure 8 (II, a), the downstream router incurs join la-
tency due to the crash of the upstream router. The state is
not corrected until the periodic broadcast takes place, and
packets are forwarded onto the LAN as in (II, b).
EU F EU NF
NH NH NC NC
(II)
SPkt
(III)
L
Prune
(a) (b)
F EU
NHRtx NH
(I)
F Crash EU
GTx
GRcv GAck
Fig. 8
Crash leading to black holes
D. Challenges and Limitations
Although we have been able to apply FOTG to PIM-DM
successfully, a discussion of the open issues and challenges is
called for. In this section we address some of these issues.
• The topologies synthesized by the above FOTG study are
only limited to a single-hop LAN with n routers 25. This
means that the above FOTG analysis is necessary but not
sufficient to verify robustness of the end-to-end behavior of
the protocol in a multi-hop topology; even if each LAN in the
topology operates correctly, the inter-LAN interaction may
introduce erroneous behaviors. Applying FOTG to multi-hop
topologies is part of future research.
• The analysis for our case studies did not consider network
delays. In order to study end-to-end protocols network delays
must be considered in the model. In [10] we introduce the
notion of virtual LAN to include end-to-end delay semantics.
• Minimal topologies that are necessary and sufficient to trig-
ger the stimuli, may not be sufficient to capture all correct-
ness violations. For example, in some cases it may require
one member to trigger a Join, but two members to expe-
rience an error caused by Join loss. Hence, the topology
synthesis stage must be complete in order to capture all pos-
sible errors. To achieve this we propose to use the symbolic
representation. For example, to cover all topologies with one
or more members we use (M1+). Integration of this notation
with the full method is part of future work.
• The efficiency of the backward search may be increased us-
ing reduction techniques, such as equivalence of states and
transitions (similar to the ones presented in Section IV). In
addition, the algorithm complexity may be reduced by utiliz-
ing information about reachable states to reduce the search.
25This limitation is similar to that suffered by FITG in Section IV.
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This information could be obtained simply by storing pre-
vious sequences and states visited. Alternatively, the de-
signer may provide information –based on protocol-specific
knowledge– about reachable states, through a compact rep-
resentation thereof.
• The topologies constructed by FOTG are inferred from the
mechanisms specified by the transition table of the GFSM.
The FOTG algorithm will not construct topologies resulting
from non-specified mechanisms. For example, if the Assert
mechanism that deals with duplicates was left out (due to
a design error) the algorithm would not construct {Fi, Fj}
topology. Hence, FOTG is not guaranteed to detect dupli-
cates in this case. So, FOTG (as presented here) may be used
to evaluate behavior of specified mechanisms in the presence
of network failures, but is not a general protocol verification
tool.
• The global states synthesized during the topology synthe-
sis phase are not guaranteed to be reachable from an ini-
tial state. Hence the algorithm may be investigating non-
reachable states, until they are detected as unreachable in
the last backward search phase. Adding reachability detec-
tion in the early stages of FOTG is subject of future work.
However, statistics collected in our case study (see Appendix
III-F) show that unreachable states are not the determining
factor in the complexity of the backward search. Hence, other
reduction techniques may be needed to increase the efficiency
of the method.
We believe that the strength of our fault-oriented method,
as was demonstrated, lies in its ability to construct the nec-
essary conditions for erroneous behavior by starting directly
from the fault and avoiding the exhaustive walk of the state
space. Also, converting timing problems into sequencing
problems (as was shown for Graft analysis) reduces the com-
plexity required to study timers. FOTG as presented in this
chapter seems best fit to study protocol robustness in the
presence of faults. Faults presented in our studies include
single selective loss of protocol messages and router crashes.
VI. Related Work
The related work falls mainly in the field of protocol veri-
fication, distributed algorithms and conformance testing. In
addition, some concepts of our work were inspired by VLSI
chip testing. Most of the literature on multicast protocol
design addresses architecture, specification, and comparisons
between different protocols. We are not aware of any other
work to develop systematic methods for test generation for
multicast protocols.
There is a large body of literature dealing with verifica-
tion of communication protocols. Protocol verification is the
problem of ensuring the logical consistency of the protocol
specification, independent of any particular implementation.
Protocol verification typically addresses well-defined proper-
ties, such as safety (e.g., freedom from deadlocks) and live-
ness (e.g., absence of non-progress cycles) [16]. In general,
the two main approaches for protocol verification are theorem
proving and reachability analysis (or model checking) [3] [4].
In theorem proving, system properties are expressed in logic
formulas, defining a set of axioms and constructing relations
on these axioms. In contrast to reachability analysis, theo-
rem proving can deal with infinite state spaces. Interactive
theorem provers require human intervention, and hence are
slow and error-prone. Theorem proving includes model-based
and logic-based formalisms. Model-based formalisms (e.g.,
Z [17], VDM [18]) are suitable for protocol specifications in a
succinct manner, but lack the tool support for effective proof
of properties. The use of first order logic allows the use of
theorem provers (e.g., Nqthm [19]), but may result in spec-
ifications that are difficult to read. Higher order logic (e.g.,
PVS [20]) provides expressive power for clear descriptions
and proof capabilities for protocol properties. The number
of axioms and relations grows with the complexity of the pro-
tocol. Axiomatization and proofs depend largely on human
intelligence, which limits the use of theorem proving systems.
Moreover, these systems tend to abstract out network failures
we are addressing in this study.
Reachability analysis algorithms [11] [21] attempt to gen-
erate and inspect all the protocol states that are reachable
from given initial states. The main types of reachability
analysis algorithms include full search and controlled partial
search. If full search exceeds the memory or time limits, it
effectively reduces to an uncontrolled partial search, and the
quality of the analysis deteriorates quickly. Such algorithm
suffers from the ‘state space explosion’ problem, especially
for complex protocols. To circumvent this problem, state
reduction and controlled partial search techniques [22] [23]
could be used. These techniques focus only on parts of the
state space and may use probabilistic [24], random [25] or
guided searches [26]. In our work we adopt approaches ex-
tending reachability analysis for multicast protocols. Our
fault-independent test generation method (in Section IV)
borrows from controlled partial search and state reduction
techniques.
Work on distributed algorithms deals with synchronous
networks, asynchronous shared memory and asynchronous
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networked systems [27]. Proofs can be established using
an automata-theoretic framework. Several studies on dis-
tributed algorithms considered failure models including mes-
sage loss or duplication, and processor failures, such as
stop (or crash) failures, transient failures, or byzantine fail-
ures [28], where failed processors behave arbitrarily. We do
not consider byzantine failures in our study. Distributed
algorithms may be treated in a formal framework, using
automata-theoretic models and state machines, where re-
sults are presented in terms of set-theoretic mathematics [27].
The formal framework is used to present proofs or impos-
sibility results. Proof methods for distributed algorithms
include invariant assertions and simulation relationships 26
that are generally proved using induction, and may be check-
able using theorem-provers, e.g., Larch theorem-prover [29].
Asynchronous network components can be modeled as timed-
automata [30], [27].
Several attempts to apply formal verification to network
protocols have been made. Assertional proof techniques were
used to prove distance vector routing [31], path vector rout-
ing [32] and route diffusion algorithms [33], [34] and [35] using
communicating finite state machines. An example point-to-
point mobile application was proved using assertional rea-
soning in [36] using UNITY [37]. Axiomatic reasoning was
used in proving a simple transmission protocol in [38]. Al-
gebraic systems based on the calculus of communicating sys-
tems (CCS) [39] have been used to prove CSMA/CD [40].
Formal verification has been applied to TCP and T/TCP
in [41].
Multicast protocols may be modeled as asynchronous net-
works, with the components as timed-automata, including
failure models. In fact, the global finite state machine
(GFSM) model used by our search algorithms is adopted from
asynchronous shared memory systems (in specific, cache co-
herence algorithms [13]) and extended with various multicast
and timing semantics. The transitions of the I/O automaton
may be given in the form of pre-conditions and effects 27.
The combination of timed automata, invariants, simulation
mappings, automaton composition, and temporal logic [42]
seem to be very useful tools for proving (or disproving) and
reasoning about safety or liveness properties of distributed al-
gorithms. It may also be used to establish asymptotic bounds
26An invariant assertion is a property that holds true for all reachable
states of the system, while a simulation is a formal relation between an
abstract solution of the problem and a detailed solution.
27This is similar to our representation of the transition table for the fault-
oriented test generation method.
on the complexity of the distributed algorithms. It is not
clear, however, how theorem proving techniques can be used
in test synthesis to construct event sequences and topolo-
gies that stress network protocols. Parts of our work draw
from distributed algorithms verification principles. Yet we
feel that our work complements such work, as we focus on
test synthesis problems.
Conformance Testing is used to check that the external
behavior of a given implementation of a protocol is equiv-
alent to its formal specification. A conformance test fails
if the implementation and specification differ. By contrast,
verification of the protocol must always reveal the design er-
ror. Given an implementation under test (IUT), sequences of
input messages are provided and the resulting output is ob-
served. The test passes only if all observed outputs matche
those of the formal specification. The sequences of input mes-
sages is called a conformance test suite and the main problem
is to find an efficient procedure for generating a conformance
test suite for a given protocol. One possible solution is to
generate a sequence of state transitions that passes through
every state and every transition at least once; also known
as a transition tour [43]. The state of the machine must
be checked after each transition with the help of unique in-
put/output (UIO) sequences 28. To be able to verify every
state in the IUT, we must be able to derive a UIO sequence
for every state separately. This approach generally suffers
from the following drawbacks. Not all states of an FSM have
a UIO sequence. Even if all states in a FSM have a UIO
sequence, the problem of deriving UIO sequences has been
proved to be p-complete in [44]; i.e. only very short UIO
sequences can be found in practice 29. UIO sequences can
identify states reliably only in a correct IUT. Their behavior
for faulty IUTs is unpredictable, and they cannot guarantee
that any type of fault in an IUT remains detectable. Only the
presence of desirable behavior can be tested by conformance
testing, not the absence of undesirable behavior.
Conformance testing techniques are important for testing
protocol implementations. However, it does not target design
errors or protocol performance. We consider work in this area
as complementary to the focus of our study.
VLSI Chip testing uses a set of well-established approaches
to generate test vector patterns, generally for detecting phys-
ical defects in the VLSI fabrication process. Common test
28A Unique Input/Output (UIO) sequence is a sequence of transitions that
can be used to determine the state of the IUT.
29In [45] a randomized polynomial time algorithm is presented for design-
ing UIO checking sequences.
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vector generation methods detect single-stuck faults; where
the value of a line in the circuit is always at logic ‘1’ or ‘0’.
Test vectors are generated based on a model of the circuit
and a given fault model. Test vector generation can be fault-
independent or fault-oriented [46] [47]. In the fault-oriented
process, the two fundamental steps in generating a test vec-
tor are to activate (or excite) the fault, and to propagate the
resulting error to an observable output. Fault excitation and
error propagation usually involve a search procedure with
a backtracking strategy to resolve or undo contradiction in
the assignment of line and input values. The line assign-
ments performed sometimes determine or imply other line
assignments. The process of computing the line values to
be consistent with previously determined values is referred
to as implication. Forward implication is implying values of
lines from the fault toward the output, while backward im-
plication is implying values of lines from the fault toward the
circuit input. Our approaches for protocol testing use some
of the above principles; such as forward and backward im-
plication. VLSI chip testing, however, is performed a given
circuit, whereas protocol testing is performed for arbitrary
and time varying topologies.
Other related work includes verification of cache coherence
protocols [13]. This study uses counting equivalence relations
and symbolic representation of states to reduce space search
complexity. We use the notion of counting equivalence in our
study.
VII. Conclusions
In this study we have proposed the STRESS framework
to integrate test generation into the protocol design process.
Specifically, we targeted automatic test generation for robust-
ness studies of multicast routing protocols. We have adopted
a global FSM model to represent the multicast protocols on
a LAN. In addition, we have used a fault model to represent
packet loss and machine crashes. We have investigated two
algorithms for test generation; namely, the fault-independent
test generation (FITG) and the fault-oriented test genera-
tion (FOTG). Both algorithms were used to study a stan-
dard multicast routing protocol, PIM-DM, and were com-
pared in terms of error coverage and algorithmic complexity.
For FITG, equivalence reduction techniques were combined
with forward search to reduce search complexity from ex-
ponential to polynomial. FITG does not provide topology
synthesis. For FOTG, a mix of forward and backward search
techniques allowed for automatic synthesis of the topology.
We believe that FOTG is a better fit for robustness studies
since it targets faults directly. The complexity for FOTG
was quite manageable for our case study. Corrections to er-
rors captured in the study were proposed with the aid of our
method and integrated into the latest PIM-DM specification.
More case studies are needed to show more general applica-
bility of our methodology.
Appendix
I. State Space Complexity
In this appendix we present analysis for the state space
complexity of our target system. In specific we present com-
pleteness proof of the state space and the formulae to com-
pute the size of the correct state space.
A. State Space Completeness
We define the space of all states as X∗, denoting zero or
more routers in any state. We also define the algebraic oper-
ators for the space, where
X∗ = X0 ∪X1 ∪X2+ (1)
(Y n, X∗) =
(
Y n+, {X − Y }∗
)
(2)
A.1 Error states
In general, an error may manifest itself as packet dupli-
cates, packet loss, or wasted bandwidth. This is mapped
onto the state of the global FSM as follows:
1. The existence of two or more forwarders on the LAN with
one or more routers expecting packet from the LAN (e.g., in
the NHX state) indicates duplicate delivery of packets.
2. The existence of one or more routers expecting packets
from the LAN with no forwarders on the LAN indicates a
deficiency in packet delivery (join latency or black holes).
3. The existence of one or more forwarders for the LAN with
no routers expecting packets from the LAN indicates wasted
bandwidth (leave latency or extra overhead).
- for duplicates: one or more NHX with two or more FX ;
(
NHX , F
2+
X , X
∗
)
(3)
- for extra bandwidth: one or more FX with zero NHX ;
(FX , {X −NHX}
∗) (4)
- for blackholes or packet loss: one or more NHX with zero
FX ;
(NHX , {X − FX}
∗) (5)
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A.2 Correct states
As described earlier, the correct states can be described by
the following rule:
∃ exactly one forwarder for the LAN iff ∃ one or more
routers expecting packets from the LAN.
- zero NHX with zero FX ;
({X −NHX − FX}
∗) (6)
- one or more NHX with exactly one FX ;
(NHX , FX , {X − FX}
∗) (7)
from (B.2) and (B.3) we get:
(
NHX , F
2+
X , {X − FX}
∗) (8)
if we take the union of (B.8), (B.5) and (B.7), and apply
(B.1) we get:
(NHX , X
∗) =
(
NH1+X , {X −NHX}
∗) (9)
also, from (B.4) and (B.2) we get:
(
F 1+X , {X −NHX − FX}
∗) (10)
if we take the union of (B.10) and (B.6) we get:
(F ∗X , {X −NHX − FX}
∗) = ({X −NHX}
∗)
(11)
taking the union of (B.9) and (B.11) we get:
(NH∗X , {X −NHX}
∗) = (X∗) (12)
which is the complete state space.
B. Number of Correct and Error State Spaces
B.1 First case definition
For the correct states: ({X −NH − F}∗) reduces the sym-
bols from which to choose the state by 2; i.e. yields the
formula:
C(n+ (s− 2)− 1, n) = C(n+ s− 3, n).
While (NH,F, {X − F}∗) reduces the number of routers
to choose by 2 and the number of symbols by 1, yielding:
C((n− 2) + (s− 1) − 1, n− 2) = C(n+ s− 4, n− 2).
B.2 Second case definition
For the correct states: ({X −NHX − FX}
∗) reduces, the
number of states by 4, yielding
C(n+ (s− 4)− 1, n) = C(n+ s− 5, n).
While (NHX , FX , {X − FX}
∗) reduces the number of
routers to n− 2 and the symbols to s− 2 and yields
4 · C((n− 2) + (s− 2)− 1, n− 2)) = 4 · C(n+ s− 5, n− 2).
We have to be careful here about overlap of sets of correct
states. For example (NH,F, {X − FX}
∗) is equivalent to
(NHRtx, F, {X − FX}
∗) when a third router is in NHRtx in
the first set and NH in the second set. Thus we need to
remove one of the sets (NH,F,NHRtx, {X − FX}
∗), which
translates in terms of number of states to
C((n− 3) + (s− 2)− 1, n− 3) = C(n+ s− 6, n− 3).
A similar argument is given when we replace F above by
FDel, thus we multiply the number of states to be removed
by 2. Thus, we get the total number of equivalent correct
states:
C(n+s−5, n)+4 ·C(n+s−5, n−2)−2 ·C(n+s−6, n−3).
To obtain the ErrorStates we can use:
ErrorStates = TotalStates− CorrectStates.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
number of routers (n)
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Error States
Correct States
Fig. 9
The percentage of the correct and error states
Figure 9 shows the percentage of each of the correct and
error state spaces, and how this percentage changes with the
number of routers. The figure is shown for the second case
error definition. Similar results were obtained for the first
case definition.
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II. Forward Search Algorithms
This appendix includes detailed procedures that imple-
ment the forward search method as described in Section IV.
It also includes detailed statistics collected for the case study
on PIM-DM.
A. Exhaustive Search
The ExpandSpace procedure given below implements an
exhaustive search, where W is the working set of states to
be expanded, V is the set of visited states (i.e. already ex-
panded), and E is the state currently being explored. Ini-
tially, all the state sets are empty. The nextState function
gets and removes the next state from W , according to the
search strategy; if depth first then W is treated as a stack,
or as a queue if breadth first.
Each state is expanded by applying the stimuli via the
‘forward’ procedure that implements the transition rules and
returns the new stable state New.
ExpandSpace(initGState){
add initGState to W
while W not empty {
E = nextGState from W ;
add E to V ;
∀ state ∈ E
∀ stim applying to state {
New = forward(E,stim);
if New /∈ W or V
add New to W ;
}
}
}
The initial state initGState may be generated using the
following procedure, that produces all possible combinations
of initial states I.S..
Init(depth,GState){
∀state ∈ I.S. {
add state to GState;
depth = depth - 1;
if depth = 0
ExpandSpace(GState);
else
Init(depth, GState);
remove last element of GState;
}
}
This procedure is called with the following parameters:
(a) number of routers n as the initial depth and (b) the
emptystate as the initial GState. It is a recursive proce-
dure that does a tree search, depth first, with the number of
                Expanded States                   
Rtrs Exhaustive Equiv Equiv+ Reduced Reduction
1 14 10 9 9 1.555556
2 52 24 18 18 2.888889
3 178 52 30 30 5.933333
4 644 114 48 48 13.41667
5 2176 238 73 73 29.80822
6 7480 496 106 106 70.56604
7 24362 1004 148 148 164.6081
8 80830 2037 200 200 404.15
9 259270 4081 263 263 985.8175
10 843440 8198 338 338 2495.385
11 2684665 16386 426 426 6302.031
12 8621630 32810 528 528 16328.84
13 27300731 65574 645 645 42326.71
14 86885238 131180 778 778 111677.7
Fig. 10
Simulation statistics for forward algorithms. ExpandedStates is
the number of visited states.
                       Forwards
Rtrs Exhaustive Equiv Equiv+ Reduced Reduction
1 80 55 51 43 1.860465
2 537 227 177 124 4.330645
3 2840 730 440 263 10.79848
4 14385 2188 970 503 28.59841
5 63372 5829 1923 881 71.9319
6 271019 14863 3491 1430 189.5238
7 1060120 35456 5916 2187 484.7371
8 4122729 82916 9480 3189 1292.797
9 15187940 187433 14523 4477 3392.437
10 55951533 419422 21429 6092 9184.428
11 199038216 921981 30648 8079 24636.49
12 708071468 2013909 42678 10483 67544.74
13 2.461E+09 4355352 58091 13353 184311
14 8.546E+09 9375196 77511 16738 510576.4
Fig. 11
Simulation statistics for forward algorithms. Forwards is the
number of calls to forward().
levels equal to the number of routers and the branching fac-
tor equal to the number of initial state symbols |I.S.| = i.s..
The complexity of this procedure is given by (i.s.)n.
B. Reduction Using Equivalence
We use the counting equivalence notion to reduce the com-
plexity of the search in 3 ways:
1. The first reduction we use is to investigate only the equiv-
alent initial states, we call this algorithm Equiv. One proce-
dure that produces such equivalent initial state space is the
EquivInit procedure given below.
EquivInit(S,i,GState){
∀state ∈ S
for j = i to 0 {
New = emptystate;
for k = 0 to j
add state to New;
New = New ·GState
S¯ = trunc(S,state);
if (i − j) = 0
ExpandSpace(New);
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                      Transitions                   
Rtrs Exhaustive Equiv Equiv+ Reduced Reduction
1 19 11 11 11 1.727273
2 90 32 31 31 2.903226
3 343 75 65 65 5.276923
4 1293 169 119 119 10.86555
5 4328 347 197 197 21.96954
6 14962 722 307 307 48.73616
7 47915 1433 449 449 106.7149
8 158913 2889 633 633 251.0474
9 503860 5717 857 857 587.9347
10 1638871 11434 1133 1133 1446.488
11 5185208 22715 1457 1457 3558.825
12 16666549 45383 1843 1843 9043.163
13 52642280 90461 2285 2285 23038.2
14 167757882 180794 2799 2799 59934.93
Fig. 12
Simulation statistics for forward algorithms. Transitions is the
number of transient states visited.
                              Error States
Rtrs Exhaustive Equiv Equiv+ Reduced Reduction
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 7 3 3 3 2.333333
3 33 7 6 6 5.5
4 191 21 13 13 14.69231
5 783 49 25 25 31.32
6 3235 115 43 43 75.23256
7 11497 239 68 68 169.0735
8 41977 504 101 101 415.6139
9 142197 1012 143 143 994.3846
10 491195 2057 195 195 2518.949
11 1625880 4101 258 258 6301.86
12 5441177 8237 333 333 16339.87
13 17751178 16425 421 421 42164.32
14 58220193 32879 523 523 111319.7
Fig. 13
Simulation statistics for forward algorithms. The number of
stable error states reached.
else
EquivInit(S¯,i − j,New);
}
}
This procedure is invoked with the following parameters: (a)
the initial set of states I.S. as S, (b) the number of routers
n as i, and (c) the emptystate as GState. The procedure
is recursive and produces the set of equivalent initial states
and invokes the ExpandSpace procedure for each equivalent
initial state. The ‘trunc’ function truncates S such that S¯
contains only the state elements in S after the element state.
For example, trunc({F,NM,M}, F ) = {NM,M}.
2. The second reduction we use is during state comparison.
Instead of comparing the actual states, we compare and store
equivalent states. Hence, the line ‘if New /∈ W or V ’ would
check for equivalent states. We call the algorithm after this
second reduction Equiv+.
3. The third reduction is made to eliminate redundant tran-
sitions. To achieve this reduction we add flag check before
invoking forward, such as stateFlag. The flag is set to 1
when the stimuli for that specific state have been applied.
We call the algorithm after the third reduction the reduced
algorithm.
C. Complexity analysis of forward search for PIM-DM
The number of reachable states visited, the number of
transitions and the number of erroneous states found were
recorded. The result is given in Figures 10, 11, 12, 13. The
reduction is the ratio of the numbers obtained using the ex-
haustive algorithm to those obtained using the reduced al-
gorithm.
The number of expanded states denotes the number of vis-
ited stable states and is measured simply as the number of
states in the set V in ‘ExpandSpace’ procedure. The number
of forwards is the number of times the ‘forward’ procedure
was called denoting the number of transitions between stable
states. The number of transitions is the number of visited
transient states that are increased with every new state vis-
ited in the ‘forward’ procedure. The number of error states
is the number of stable (or expanded) states violating the
correctness conditions.
The number of transitions is reduced from O(4n) for the
exhaustive algorithm to O(n4) for the reduced algorithm.
This means that we have obtained exponential reduction in
complexity, as shown in Figure 14.
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Reduction ratio from exhaustive to the reduced algorithm
III. FOTG Algorithms
This appendix includes pseudo-code for procedures imple-
menting the fault-oriented test generation (FOTG) method
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presented in Section V. In addition, it includes detailed re-
sults of our case study to apply FOTG to PIM-DM.
A. Pre-Conditions
The procedure described below takes as input the set of
post-conditions for the FSM stimuli and genrates the set
of pre-conditions. The ‘conds’ array contains the post-
conditions (i.e., the effects of the stimuli on the system) and
is indexed by the stimulus. The ‘stimulus’ function returns
the stimulus (if any) of the condition. The ‘transition’ func-
tion returns the transition or state of the condition 30. The
pre-conditions are stored in an array ‘preConds’ indexed by
the stimulus.
PreConditions{
∀stim ∈ τ
∀cond ∈ conds[stim]{
s = stimulus(cond);
t = transition(cond);
add t.stim to preConds[s];
}
}
B. Dependency Table
The ‘dependencyTable’ procedure generates the depen-
dency table depTable from the transition table of conditions
conds.
dependencyTable{
∀stim ∈ τ
∀cond ∈ conds[stim] {
endState = end(cond);
startState = start(cond);
add startState.stim to depTable[endState];
}
}
For each state s, that is endState of a transition, a set of
startState – stimulus pairs leading to the creation of s is
stored in the depTable array. For s ∈ I.S. a symbol denoting
initial state is added to the array entry. For our case study
I.S. = {NM,EU}.
C. Topology Synthesis
The following procedure synthesizes minimum topologies
necessary to trigger the various stimuli of the protocol. It
performs the third and forth steps of the topology synthesis
procedure explained in Section V-B.
buildMinTopos(stim){
∀cond ∈ preConds[stim]{
st = end(cond);
stm = stimulus(cond);
if type(stm) = orig
30If there’s a state in the condition, this may be viewed as state → state
transition, i.e., transition to the same state.
add st to MinTopos[stim];
else {
if 6 ∃Topo(stm)
buildMinTopos(stm);
∀topo ∈ MinTopos[stim]
add st to MinTopos[stim];
}
}
}
D. Backward Search
The ‘Backward’ procedure calls the ‘Rewind’ procedure to
perform the backward search. A set of visited states V is kept
to avoid looping. For each state in GState possible back-
ward implications are attempted to obtain valid backward
steps toward initial state. ‘Backward’ is called recursively
for preceding states as a depth first search. If all backward
branches are exhausted and no initial state was reached the
state is declared unreachable.
Backward(GState){
if GState ∈ V
return loop
add GState to V
∀s ∈ GState{
bkwds = depTable[s];
∀bk ∈ bkwds{
New = Rewind(bk,GState,s);
if New = done
break;
else
Backward(New);
}
}
if all states are done
return reached
else
return unreachable
}
The ‘Rewind’ procedure takes the global state one
step backward by applying the reverse transition rules.
‘replace(s,st,GState)’ replaces s in GState with st and re-
turns the new global state. Depending on the stimulus
type of the backward rule bk, different states in GState are
rolled back. For orig and dst only the originator and des-
tination of the stimulus is rolled back, respectively. For
mcast, all affected states are rolled back except the origi-
nator. mcastDownstream is similar to mcast except that
all downstream routers or states are rolled back, while only
one upstream router (the destination) is rolled back.
Rewind(bk,GState,s){
if bk ∈ I.S.
return done;
stim = stimulus(bk);
st = start(bk);
if type(stim) = orig {
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Total Average
Backwards Rewinds BackTracks  Backwards Rewinds BackTracks
Unreachable (6) 223 586 293 37.16 97.6 48.8
Reachable (16) 23030 61212 31736 1439 3825 1983
Total (22) 23253 61798 32029 1057 2809 1455
Fig. 15
Case study statistics for applying FOTG to PIM-DM
New = replace(s,st,GState);
return New;
}
∀cond ∈ preconds[stim] &
while src not found {
str = start(cond);
if str ∈ GState
src found
}
if src not found
return backTrack;
if type(stim) = dst {
New = replace(s,st,GState);
if checkMinTopo(New,stim)
return New;
else
return backTrack;
if not checkConsistency(stim,GState)
return backTrack;
New = GState;
if type(stim) = mcast
∀cond ∈ conds[stim]
if end(cond) ∈ GState & not src
New = replace(end,start,GState);
if type(stim) = mcastDownstream
∀cond ∈ conds[stim]
if end(cond) ∈ GState & not upstream
New = replace(end,start,GState);
else if end ∈ GState & upstream
New = replace(end,start,GState) once;
if checkMinTopo(New,stim)
return New;
else
return backTrack;
}
The following procedure checks for consistency of applying
stim to GState.
checkConsistency(stim,GState){
∀cond ∈ conds[stim] & cond has transition
if start(cond) ∈ GState
return False;
else
return True;
}
The following procedure checks if GState contains the nec-
essary components to trigger the stimulus.
checkMinTopo(GState,stim){
if ∃MinTopos[stim] ⊆ GState
return True;
else
return False;
}
E. Simulation results
We have conducted a case study of PIM-DM analysis us-
ing FOTG. A total of 22 topologies were automatically con-
structed using as faults the selective loss of Join/Prune,
Graft, and Assert messages. Out of the constructed topolo-
gies (or global states) 6 were unreachable global states and 16
were reachable. The statistics for the total and average num-
ber of backward calls, rewind calls and backtracks is given in
Figure 15.
Although the topology synthesis study we have presented
above is not complete, we have covered a large number of
corner cases using only a manageable number of topologies
and search steps.
To obtain a complete representation of the topologies, we
suggest to use the symbolic representation 31 presented in
Section III. Based on our initial estimates we expect the
number of symbolic topology representations to be approx-
imately 224 topologies, ranging from 2 to 8-router LAN
topologies, for the single selective loss and single crash mod-
els.
F. Experimental statistics for PIM-DM
To investigate the utility of FOTG as a verification tool we
ran this set of simulations. This is not, however, how FOTG
is used to study protocol robustness (see previous section for
case study analysis).
We also wanted to study the effect of unreachable states on
the complexity of the verification. The simulations for our
case study show that unreachable states do not contribute
in a significant manner to the complexity of the backward
search for larger topologies. Hence, in order to use FOTG as
a verification tool, it is not sufficient to add the reachability
detection capability to FOTG.
The backward search was applied to the equivalent error
states (for LANs with 2 to 5 routers connected). The simula-
tion setup involved a call to a procedure similar to ‘EquivInit’
in Appendix II-B, with the parameter S as the set of state
31We have used the repetition constructs ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘*’.
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                                            Backwards
                  total                   average
 all states Reachable Unreachable all states  Reachable Unreachable
280 64 216 10.77 7.111 12.71
3965 1056 2909 38.12 37.71 38.28
58996 30694 28302 180.4 383.7 114.6
899274 612009 287265 1021 3255 414.5
                      Number of calls to Backward()
                                              Rewinds
                   total                  average
all states Reachable Unreachable all states Reachable Unreachable
471 116 355 18.12 12.89 20.88
8309 2379 5930 79.89 84.96 78.03
134529 71954 62575 411.4 899.4 253.3
2067426 1414365 653061 2347 7523 942.4
                            Number of calls to Rewind()
                                            BackTracks
                     total                   average
all states Reachable Unreachable all states Reachable Unreachable
163 30 133 6.269 3.333 7.824
3459 946 2513 33.26 33.79 33.07
60321 32684 27637 184.5 408.6 111.9
950421 656028 294393 1079 3490 424.8
                                  Number of back tracks
for Error states
Fig. 16
Simulation statistics for backward algorithms
symbols, and after an error check was done a call is made to
the ‘Backward’ procedure instead of ‘ExpandSpace’.
States were classified as reachable or unreachable. For the
four topologies studied (LANs with 2 to 5 routers) statistics
were measured (e.g., max, min, median, average, and total)
for number of calls to the ‘Backward’ and ‘Rewind’ proce-
dures, and the number of backTracks were measured. As
shown in Figure 16, the statistics show that, as the topology
grows, all the numbers for the reachable states get signif-
icantly larger than those for the unreachable states (as in
Figure 17), despite the fact that that the percentage of un-
reachable states increases with the topology as in Figure 18.
The reason for such behavior is due to the fact that when
the state is unreachable the algorithm reaches a dead-end rel-
atively early (by exhausting one branch of the search tree).
However, for reachable states, the algorithm keeps on search-
ing until it reaches an initial global state. Hence the reach-
able states search constitutes the major component that con-
tributes to the complexity of the algorithm.
G. Results
We have implemented an early version of the algorithm in
the NS/VINT environment (see http://catarina.usc.edu/vint)
and used it to drive detailed simulations of PIM-DM therein,
to verify our findings. In this section we discuss the results of
applying our method to PIM-DM. The analysis is conducted
for single selective message loss.
For the following analyzed messages, we present the steps
for topology synthesis, forward and backward implication.
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Complexity of the FOTG algorithm for error states
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2 3 4 5
number of routers (n)
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Unreachable
Reachable
Fig. 18
Percentage of reachable/unreachable error states using FOTG
G.1 Join
Following are the resulting steps for join loss:
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Synthesizing the Global State
1. Set the inspected message to Join
2. The startState of the post-condition is Fdst Del =⇒ GI = {Fj Del}
3. The state of the pre-condition is NHi =⇒ GI = {NHi, Fj Del}
4. The stimulus of the pre-condition is Prune. Set the inspected message
to Prune
5. The startState of the post-condition is Fj which can be implied from
Fj Del in GI
6. The state of the pre-condition is NCk =⇒ GI = {NHi, Fj Del, NCk}
7. The stimulus of the pre-condition is L. Set the inspected message to L
8. The startState of the post-condition is NH which can be implied from
NC in GI
9. The state of the pre-condition is Ext, an external event
Forward implication
without loss: GI = {NHi, Fj Del,NCk}
Join
−→ GI+1 = {NHi, Fj,NCk}
correct state
loss w.r.t. Rj : {NHi, Fj Del,NCk}
Del
−→ GI+1 = {NHi,NFj,NCk}
error state
Backward implication
GI = {NHi, Fj Del,NCk}
Prune
←− GI−1 = {NHi, Fj, NCk}
FPkt
←−
GI−2 = {Mi, Fj,NMk}
SPkt
←− GI−3 = {Mi, EUj,NMk}
HJi
←− GI−4 =
{NMi,EUj ,NMk} = I.S.
Losing the Join by the forwarding router Rj leads to an
error state where router Ri is expecting packets from the
LAN, but the LAN has no forwarder.
G.2 Assert
Following are the resulting steps for the Assert loss:
Synthesizing the Global State
1. Set the inspected message to Assert
2. The startState of the post-condition is Fj =⇒ GI = {Fj}
3. The state of the pre-condition is Fi =⇒ GI = {Fi, Fj}
4. Stimulus of pre-condition is FPktj . Set inspected message to FPktj
5. The startState of the post-condition is EUi, implied from Fi in Gi
6. The state of the pre-condition is Fj , already in GI
7. Stimulus of pre-condition is SPktj . Set inspected message to SPktj
8. The startState of the post-condition is NFj , implied from Fj in GI
9. The stimulus of the pre-condition is Ext, an external event
Forward Implication
GI = {Fi, Fj}
Asserti
−→ GI+1 = {Fi,NFj} error
Backward Implication
GI = {Fi, Fj}
FPktj
←− GI−1 = {EUi, Fj}
SPktj
←− GI−2 = {EUi, EUj} = I.S.
The error in the Assert case occurs even in the absence
of message loss. This error occurs due to the absence of a
prune to stop the flow of packets to a LAN with no down-
stream receivers. This problem occurs for topologies with
GI = {Fi, Fj , . . . , Fk}, as that shown in Figure 19.
G.3 Graft
Following are the resulting steps for the Graft loss:
LAN
Source
Fi Fj Fk. . .
Fig. 19
A topology having a {Fi, Fj , . . . , Fk} LAN
Synthesizing the Global State
1. Set the inspected message to GraftRcv
2. The startState of the post-condition is NF =⇒ GI = {NF}
3. the endState of the pre-condition is NHRtx =⇒ GI = {NF,NHRtx}
4. The stimulus of the pre-condition is GraftTx
5. The startState of the post-condition is NH, implied from NHRtx in GI
6. the endState of the pre-condition is NH which may be implied
7. the stimulus of the pre-condition is HJ, which is Ext (external)
Forward Implication
without loss: GI = {NH,NF}
GraftTx
−→ GI+1 = {NHRtx, NF}
GraftRcv
−→ GI+2 = {NHRtx, F}
GAck
−→ GI+3 = {NH,F} correct state
with loss of Graft: GI = {NH,NF}
GraftTx
−→ GI+1 = {NHRtx, NF}
Timer
−→
GI+2 = {NH,NF}
GraftTx
−→ GI+3 = {NHRtx,NF}
GraftRcv
−→
GI+4 = {NHRtx, F}
GAck
−→ GI+5 = {NH,F} correct state
We did not reach an error state when the Graft was lost,
with non-interleaving external events.
H. Interleaving events and Sequencing
A Graft message is acknowledged by the Graft − Ack
(GAck) message, and if not acknowledged it is retransmitted
when the retransmission timer expires. In an attempt to cre-
ate an erroneous scenario, the algorithm generates sequences
to clear the retransmission timer, and insert an adverse event.
Since the Graft reception causes an upstream router to be-
come a forwarder for the LAN, the algorithm interleaves a
Leave event as an adversary event to cause that upstream
router to become a non-forwarder.
To clear the retransmission timer, the algorithm inserts the
transition (NH
GAck
←− NHRtx) in the event sequence.
Forward Implication
GI = {NH,NF}
GraftTx−→ GI+1 = {NHRtx, NF}
GAck
−→
GI+2 = {NH,NF} error state.
Backward Implication:
Using backward implication, we can construct a sequence
of events leading to conditions sufficient to trigger the GAck.
From the transition table these conditions are {NHRtx, F}
32:
GI = {NH,NF}
HJ
←− GI−1 = {NC,NF}
Del
←− GI−2 =
32We do not show all branching or backtracking steps for simplicity.
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{NC, FDel}
Prune
←− GI−3 = {NC,F}
L
←− GI−4 =
{NHRtx, F}.
To generate the GAck we continue the backward implica-
tion and attempt to reach an initial state:
GI−4 = {NHRtx, F}
GraftRcv←− GI−5 = {NHRtx, NF}
GraftTx←−
GI−6 = {NH,NF}
HJ
←− GI−7 = {NC,NF}
Del
←− GI−8 =
{NC, FDel}
Prune
←− GI−9 = {NC, F}
FPkt
←− GI−10 =
{NM,F}
SPkt
←− GI−11 = {NM,EU} = I.S.
Hence, when a Graft followed by a Prune is interleaved
with the Graft loss, the retransmission timer is reset with
the receipt of the GAck for the first Graft, and the systems
ends up in an error state.
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